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THE "ANTI-HATE" ACT
LLOYD C. WAMPLER*
Probably no other enactment of the 1947 session of the
Indiana General Assembly met with stronger public and
legislative support at the time of passage than the so-calledl
"anti-hate" bill.1 For lawyers and law students its popularity
may be overshadowed somewhat by concern regarding its
validity and by the difficulties inherent in its interpretation
and construction. Since many of its provisions are unusual,
2
a brief summary of the statute seems appropriate.
Entitled "An Act concerning hatred by reason of race,
color or religion, and to effectuate the Bill of Rights . . ",
the statute declares the public policy of the state and of the
act to be the protection of the "economic welfare, health, peace.
domestic tranquility, morals, property rights and interests"
of the state and its people, the prevention of "racketeering in
hatred" and the prohibition of "agreeing, combining, uniting,
confederating, conspiring, organizing, associating or assem-
bling for the purpose of creating, advocating, spreading or dis-
seminating hatred by reason of race, color or religion."3 The
malicious doing of the above acts is made unlawful in in-
stances where such acts tend or threaten to cause riot, dis-
order, interference with highway traffic, destruction of prop-
erty, breach of peace, violence, or denial of civil or constitu-
tional rights.4  The act furthdr provides for penalties5 and
* Third year student, School of Law, Indiana University.
1. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56.
2. Compare New Jersey Laws 1935, c. 151, which provided: "Any
person who shall, in the presence of two or more persons, in any
language, make or utter any speech, statement or declaration, which
in any way incites, counsels, promotes, or advocates hatred, abuse,
violence or hostility against any group or groups of persons resid-
ing or being in this state by reason of race, color, religion or man-
ner of worship, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The statute
was invalidated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A. (2d) 877 (1941). Also see Ill. Laws
1917, p. 362, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1945) c. 38, § 471, applied in People v.
Simcox, 379 Ill. 347, 40 N.E. (2d) 525 (1942).
3. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56, § 1.
4. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56, § 2, "(A) It shall be unlawful for any per-
son or persons to combine, unite, confederate, conspire, organize
or associate with any other person or persons for the purpose of
creating, advocating, spreading or disseminating malicious hatred
by reason of race, color, or religion not prohibited by law, for or
against any person, persons or group of persons, individually or
collectively, not alien enemies of the United States."
"(B) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons acting
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injunctions6 against violation and prohibits the issuance of
corporate charters 7 and privileges$ to violators or threatened
violators and requires the forfeiture of charters9 and privil-
eges'0 of a corporation which does or exists for the purpose of
doing, any of the acts prohibited. Certain presumptions are
created.",
with malice to create, advocate, spread, or disseminate hatred for
or against any person, persons or group of persons, individually
or collectively, by reason of race, color or religion which threatens
to, tends to, or causes riot, disorder, interference with traffic up-
on the streets or public highways, destruction of property, breach
of peace, violence, or denial of civil or constitutional rights."
5. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56 § 3. "Any person violating any of the pro-
visions of Section 2 of this Act shall be deemed guilty of racket-
eering in hatred, and upon conviction, shall be disfranchised and
rendered incapable of holding any office of profit or trust for any
determinate period not exceeding ten (10) years, and shall be
fined in any sum not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000),
to which may be added imprisonment in the state prison for any
determinate period not exceeding two (2) years."
6. Id. § 4. "Any of the acts prohibited by Section 2 may be restrained
and enjoined by any court having equitable jurisdiction in an ac-
tion brought by the State of Indiana either on the relation of any
Prosecuting Attorney of any judicial circuit or the Attorney Gen-
eral of Indiana. The State either on the relation of any such
Prosecuting Attorney or the Attorney General may bring proper
actions for contempt of court for the violation of any restraining
order or injunction."
7. Id. § 5. "No corporate charter shall be issued for any domestic
corporation, nor shall any corporation organized under the laws
of another state be admitted to do business within Indiana if said
domestic or foreign corporation be organized for the purpose of
doing any of the acts prohibited by Section 2 or which shall do
any of the acts prohibited by Section 2, and the acts prohibited
by Section 2 of any two (2) or more of its members or officers
purporting to be pursuant to or for said corporation, or as a part
of its activities, whether authorized by the corporate charter or not,
shall be deemed to be the acts of said corporation."
8. Id. § 5.
9. Id. 8 6. "Any corporation organized for the purpose of doing any
of the acts prohibited by Section 2, or which shall do any of the
acts prohibited by said Section, shall have its corporate charter
forfeited and terminated by an action brought by the State of
Indiana on the relation of the Attorney General of Indiana in any
circuit or superior court and the acts prohibited by Section 2 of
any two (2) or more of its members or officers purporting to be
pursuant to or for said corporation, or as a part of its activities,
whether authorized by the corporate charter or not, shall be deemedto be the acts of said corporation and subject its charter to forfeit-ure. If ahy corporation organized under the laws of another state
shall do any of the acts herein prohibited and shall have been ad-
mitted to do business within this state, such authority to do business
within Indiana shall be forfeited and terminated in the same man-ner as in this section provided for domestic corporations."
10. Id. § 6.
11. Id. §§ 6, 6.
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One of the many interesting features of the statute,
and one which it is well to consider before proceeding further,
is Section 10 which states that "no provision of any section of
this act shall be construed to prohibit any right protected by
the federal constitution or the Constitution of the State of
Indiana, including but not limited to rights of freedom of
speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion." If such
a provision in statutes were given literal effect it seems im-
probable that the doctrine of judicial review12 could long sur-
vive in its present form. As an expression of legislative intent
Section 10 would seem, at best, to be no more than declaratory
of the rule of statutory construction that the legislature will
be presumed to have acted with integrity and with an honest
purpose to keep within constitutional limits.' 3 Construed in
this manner, the section would be given a harmless meaning in
order to pay respect to another rule of statutory construction,
namely, that the legislature cannot be presumed to do a futile"
thing.' This appears to be the most feasible construction
of Section 10, especially in view of the fact that the statute
also contains the mote usual and conventional type of "saving"
12. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803). Because the doc-
trine of this case is so well settled in American jurisprudence
it is felt that measures more drastic than § 10 of the Indiana anti-
hate act will be required to unsettle it. The doctrine has been
reaffirmed by recent Indiana cases: compare, Pennington v. Stew-
art, 212 Ind. 553, 562, 10 N.E. (2d) 619, 623 (1937); Hollingsworth
v. State Board of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E. (2d) 64(1940); Heath v. Fennig, 219 Ind. 629, 40 N.E. (2d) 329 (1942).
"The power to declare a statute void on the ground that it is in
conflict with the constitution is peculiar of the American courts. ..
The early cases show that the courts at first asserted this doctrine
with much hesitation. . . . , but it is now firmly fixed in our law."
Robinson v. Schenk, 102 Ind. 307, 319 (1884) quoted in State v.
Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 180, 41 N.E. 145, 149 (1895). See Hotel &
Restaurant Employees Union v. Wis. Employment Relations Board,
315 U.S. 437 (1942), involving a state statute which provided that
nothing in the act should "be so construed as to invade unlawfully
the right to freedom of speech."
13. Conter v. Commercial Bank, 209 Ind. 510, 513, 199 N.E. 567, 569(1935); Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904). ["...
this presumption, though frequently reiterated, has little operative
effect in the determination of a particular case. The presumption
in asserted as frequently when the statute is declared unconstitu-
tional as it i when constitutional attack is denied. The presump-
tion is obviously not conclusive and has, apparently, little effect
upon the actual decision of cases." Sutherland, "Statutory Con-
struction," § 4509 (3rd ed., 1943)].
14. Groher v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 94 Ind. App. 234, 245, 178
N.E. 242 (1931); Sutherland, "Statutory Construction," § 4510(3rd ed., 1943); Richmond Baking Co. v. Department of Treasury,
215 Ind. 110, 18 N.E. (2d) 778 (1939).
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or "separation" clause.15 An alternative possibility of con-
stitutional attack would be to question the validity of state
action taken pursuant to the statute. In Fiske v. Kansas,0
for example, the Statute in question was not invalidated al-
though its application to the particular situation was held
to be a denial of due process.
It is axiomatic that the terms of a penal statute creat-
ing a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties. The highest Court has
held that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication violates the first essentials of due process.1 7 Is
"hatred" a term so vague as to make the statute void for in-
definiteness? Though the cases are confusing 8 it is submit-
ted that an attack on this ground might not be without merit. 0
The argument is strengthened by the Court's language in
Connally v. General Construction Co.,'9a where, after a consid-
eration of many leading cases on the subject, the Court said:
"The question whether given legislative enactments have
been . . . wanting in certainty has frequently been before
this court. In some of the cases the statutes involved were up-
held; in others declared invalid. The precise point of differ-
entiation in some instances is not easy of statement; but . . .
generally . . . the decisions of the court upholding statutes
as sufficiently certain rested upon the conclusion that they
employed words or phrases having a technical or special mean-
ing, well enough known to enable those within their reach to
15. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56, § 12. (If § 12 is to be interpreted literally
it obviously would be a non sequitur to interpret § 10 literally.
Furthermore, a literal interpretation of both sections would do
violence to the rule of construction discussed in note 14, supra.)
16. 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
17. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), cited
aad -relied upon in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
18. Aigler (R.W.), "Legislation in Vague or General Terms," 21 Mich.
L. Rev. 831 (1923), and Indiana cases cited.
19. In an opinion invalidating a somewhat similar penal statute, (note
2, supra), the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "As well try
to point to a spot within a triangle which is equidistant from
every point in the area enclosed as say when hatred takes the
place of some lesser emotion." State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L., 395,
403, 22 A. (2d). 877, 882 (1941).
19a. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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correctly apply them. . . or a well-settled common law mean-
ing . . . or that for reasons found to result either from the
text of the statutes involved or the subjects with which they
dealt, a standard of some sort was afforded. .... "
It could hardly be contended that "hatred" is a term
liaving a technical or special meaning.2° Neither is the au-
thor able to discover any well-settled common law meaning
of the term.21 The argument against indefiniteness, however,
would doubtless rest upon cases recognizing a sufficient stand-
ard resulting from the text or subject matter of the statute.22
Since a court will examine the history of the times in con-
struing a statute,23 it might not be unreasonable to conclude
that most persons understand sufficiently the type of con-
duct which the legislature sought to prevent. Quod tacite
intelligitur deesse non videtur. Early convictions under this
theory would seem to furnish the basis for a "common law"
meaning of the term which, in turn, might save the statute
from future attacks as to this form of indefiniteness. The
possibility of indefiniteness in a somewhat different sense is
discussed below in another connection.
One is impressed by the remarkable similarity between
Section 2(B) of the statute and the common law concept of
criminal defamation.2 4  In view of this similarity, it seems
appropriate to inquire why the legislature did not label the
crime a "libel" or "slander." 25 Why did the legislature feel
20. The legislative definition of the term "hatred" leaves much to be
desired. § 9 of the act provides: "The term 'hatred' as used in
this act shall mean and include malevolent ill will, animosity,
odium, detestation and rancor."
21. It has been suggested, however, that the word "hatred" is capable
of interpretation in terms of libelous conduct. Note, 42 Col. L.
Rev. 857, 862 (1942). Such an interpretation of the word might
be feasible if the instant act is construed as a criminal libel stat-
ute as suggested below.
22. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918); United States v.
Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942).
23. State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168, 41 N.E. 145 (1895).
24. For discussion of common law concept of criminal defamation, see
19 A.L.R. 1477 (1922).
25. There is early precedent for the rule that a class may be crim-
inally libelled. In Rex v. Osborn, 2 Barnard K.B. 138, 94 Eng.
Rep. 406 (1732), it was held libelous to charge the Portuguese
Jews with having burned a bastard child begotten by a Christian
of a Jewish woman. Although no particular person could show
that he was pointed at more than others, the court said that "the
whole commuunity of Jews was struck at" and that whenever that
was the case the court ought to interpose. Annotations 19 A.L.R.
19471 299
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it necessary to create a "new" crime called "racketeering in
hatred"? One possibility is suggested: The Constitution of
the State of Indiana provides that in any prosecution for libel,
truth shall be a defense, 2 and this has been held to apply in
criminal libel even though the publication was not in good
faith.2 7 It is understandable that libelous publication is not
less likely to produce violations of the public peace merely
because it is founded in truth.2' "'The greater the truth, the
greater the libel' was a maxim of the common law that was
applicable in criminal actions for libel on the theory that
the criminal aspect of a libel, its tendency to provoke a breach
of the peace, was unaffected by the truth or falsity of the
defamatory remarks. ' 29  Certainly it does not require a vivid
imagination to understand that skillful or excessive publica-
tion of the truth in a particular community might create
racial or religious hatred which would threaten the peace and
safety of the community. Indeed this is probably the method
which a shrewd baiter of minorities would adopt in order to
stir up hatred and violence. Consider the effect, for exam-
ple, of undue emphasis in the public press of serious crimes
by negroes and the "playing down" of similar crimes com-
mitted by "pinks."3 0  The effectiveness of such a technique
is too well known to all Americans, including Hoosiers. It is
probably still true that "the greater the truth, the greater
the libel" if the libel is measured by the quantum of violence
produced. It seems quite likely that the draftsmen of the anti-
hate bill and the Indiana legislature recognized these social
facts when they gave a new name to an old crime.
This introduces the question of whether a white horse
if painted black remains a horse or becomes a cow. It is
often said that one cannot do indirectly that which he cannot
do directly. Does this maxim apply to the legislature? By
1455, 1532 (1922); 33 Am. Jur. 294, § 313; David Riesman, "Democ-
racy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel," 42 Col. L. Rev. 727(1942).
26. Ind. Const. Art. I, § 10.
27. Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461 (1884); State v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42,
23 N.E. 677 (1889); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 10-3201,
10-3202; Note, 20 Ind. L.J. 225 (1945).
28. Note 19 A.L.R. 1477 (1922).
29. Harper, "Law of Torts," § 244 (1933).
30. Shaw, "Everybody's Political What's What?" pp. 130-131 (1944).
In China the "white" man is more accurately described as the
"pink" man.
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assigning the name "racketeering in hatred" to ingredients
which at common law constituted criminal defamation, can
constitutional provisions which would apply to the latter,
if libel, be evaded by substituting the new label for the old?
If the question is answered in the negative, truth would be-
come a justification in all situations arising under the statute
which, at common law, would have been criminal libel.31 Such
an interpretation would not invalidate any part of the statute,
however, since the statute does not go so far as to say that
truth shall not be a defense.32
It has been noted that sections 5 and 6 create certain
presumptions. Inasmuch as Section 5 merely establishes a
condition upon which a corporate charter or privilege to do
business shall not be granted, there would seem to be little
doubt, if any, about the validity of the presumption which it
creates. It is well settled that a state has very wide discre-
tion in such matters.33 Therefore, the presumption created by
Section 5 is doubtless valid irrespective of the manner in
which the Section is construed.
Section 6, however, presents a somewhat different prob-
lem. It provides: "Any corporation organized for the purpose
of doing any of the acts prohibited by Section 2, or which
shall do any of the acts prohibited by said section, shall have
its corporate charter forfeited and terminated by an action
brought by the State of Indiana on relation of the Attorney
General of Indiana in any circuit or superior court and the
acts prohibited by Section 2 of any two or more of its mem-
bers or officers purporting to be pursuant to or for said .cor-
poration, or as a part of its activities, whether authorized by
the corporate charter or not,3 4 shall be deemed to be the acts
31. In Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461 (1884), it was held that the word
"libel" must be taken in its common law sense, even though the
statute concerned did not define the meaning of the words em-
ployed in describing the offense.
32. Under this -rationale the constitutional provision (note 26, supra)
would be self-executing.
33. Cf. Grand Rapids R.R. v. Osborn, 193 U.S. 17 (1904); State v.
Ku Klux Klan, 117 Kan. 564, 232 Pac. 254 (1925), appeal dis-
missed, Ku Klux Klan v. State, 273 U.S. 664 (1927); Horn Silver
Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U.S. 305, 312-315 (1892); Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 652 (1895); Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co.,
252 U.S. 499 (1920); Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129,
137 (1921). See Notes, 7 R.C.L. 619; 20 C.J.S. § 1810.
34. Although ordinarily a corporation is treated as a legal entity sep-
arate and distinct in identity from the members who compose it
[Dep't of Treas. v. Crowder, 214 Ind. 252, 15 N.E. (2d) 84 (1938)
19471
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of said corporation and subject its charter to forfeiture . . ."
There is a similar provision with respect to foreign corpora-
tions admitted to do business within the state.3 5
Since the exact nature of the presumption created is not
made clear by the wording of the statute, the constitutionality
of Section 6 may depend upon the manner in which it is con-
strued and applied by the state courts.36  Inasmuch as it is
the purpose of this paper merely to point out certain prob-
lems presented by the Indiana statute, no attempt is made
here to re-examine in detail the munltitude of conflicting state
decisions involving the constitutionality of statutory presump-
tions.3 7 But there are certain well-settled principles stated
in the leading cases and by the authorities.
Writers and courts have usually divided presumptions
into two main classes: (1) conclusive or absolute presump-
tions, and (2) prima facie or rebuttable presumptions.3 8 There
is considerable modern agreement that the so-called con-
clusive presumption is really not a presumption at all, but
a rule of substantive law39 couched in "awkward phraseolo-
gy.,, 40 Furthermore, there seems to be wide agreement that
there is nothing constitutionally objectionable in a conclusive
presumption per se.41 One writer points out, for example,
that most courts seem to understand the "true character" of
(for tax purposes)], it is well settled that the corporate entity will
be disregarded when it is used to accomplish an illegal act [18
C.J.S. 380 §7 (b)]. When the fiction of the corporate entity has been
urged to an intent not within its reason or purpose, the courts have
not failed to recognize that a corporation is in fact a collection of
individuals [18 C.J.S. 376, § 6].
35. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56, § 6.
36. Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 459-463 (1944).
37. For detailed treatments of the subject see Paul Brosman, "The
Statutory Presumption," 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17-54, 178-210 (1930);
Morgan, "Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions
Created by State Legislation," Harvard Legal Essays, 323-356
(1934); see also Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 100 (1929).
38. Brosman, "The Statutory Presumption," 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17-18(1930).
39. Id. at 24.
40. Morgan, "Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions
Created by State Legislation," Harvard Legal Essays, 323, 329(1934). See 4 Wigmore, "Evidence" (3rd Ed. 1940) p. 715, for in-
stances in which a conclusive presumption is a rule of evidence.
41. 4 Wigmore, "Evidence" (3rd Ed. 1940) § 1353, p. 714; Thayer,
"Preliminary Treatise on Evidence" (1898), p. 316; Brosman, "The
Statutory Presumption," 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 28 (1930); Morgan,
"Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon Presumptions Created
by State Legislation," Harvard Legal Essays, 323, 328-330 (1934).
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the conclusive presumption and consider it as a rule of sub-
stantive law, regardless of the form in which it is expressed.
Other courts, however, have considered it as a rule of evidence
which prevents the courts from investigating and determining
the truth of the particular issue. 42 The "true test" is stated
to be: "Can the legislature constitutionally do what it is seek-
ing to do independently of the language of the presumption?
If it can, the particular statutory [conclusive] presumption
is unobjectionable; but if some constitutional principle oper-
ates to forbid it, the statute must be held bad."43 Using this
test, the presumption created by Section 6 of the anti-hate act
would seem to be valid if construed as a conclusive presump-
tion. It is settled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
deny to the state power to exclude a foreign coi-poration from
doing business within the state,44 and in a recent decision the
highest court re-affirmed the proposition that a state's power
to exclude a foreign corporation does not end as soon as the
corporation has lawfully entered the state. "Subsequent leg-
islation excluding such a corporation from continuing in the
state has been sustained as an exercise of the general power
to exclude foreign corporations which does not offend due
process."'45 Similar reasoning would seem to apply to domes-
tic corporations where the public interest sought to be pro-
tected by the statutory provision for forfeiture reasonably
outweighs the interest in the continuation of the charter.40
42. The Indiana court seems to have adopted this view in both civil
and criminal cases. In B. & 0. S. W. Ry. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25,
33, 62 N.E. 488, 491 (1901), it was stated: "The rule is well set-
tled that the legislative department is not authorized to declare
that certain facts or evidence shall create a conclusive presump-
tion and thereby override the essential facts in the case, or pre-
clude a party in an action from asserting and proving the truth."
Citing many Indiana cases. Cf. Voght v. State, 124 Ind. 358, 24
N.E. 680 (1890); Darbyshire v. State, 196 Ind. 608, 149 N.E. 168
(1926).
43. Brosman, "The Statutory Presumption," 5 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 31
(1930); cf. Morgan, "Federal Constitutional Limitations Upon
Presumptions Created by State Legislation," Harvard Legal Es-
says, 323, 328-330 (1934).
44. Note 33, supra.
45. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 211-212 (1945),
citing cases.
46. Although a corporate charter has long been held to constitute a
contract within the meaning of the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution [Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819)], there has been a tendency on the part of
the Court to restrict the application of the contract clause to sit-
uations where the state "unreasonably" impairs the obligation of
1947"1
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This result, however, would not necessarily follow if the court
chooses to regard the conclusive presumption as a rule of
evidence rather than a rule of substantive law.47
If the presumptions created by Section 6 are construed
as prima facie presumptions their validity will depend upon
whether there can be said to be a sufficiently rational con-
nection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed.48 The presumption is invalid if the inference of the
ultimate fact from the fact proved is arbitrary because of
lack of connection between the two in common experience.
The Court has observed, however, that the test is not whether
the statutory presumption rests upon a view of relation broad-
er than that which a jury might take in a specific case, but
whether the inference is "so strained as not to have a reason-
able relation to the circumstances of life as we know them."'"
Whether the doing of acts prohibited by Section 2 by two or
more officers or members of a corporation who purport to
act for the corporation is a sufficient basis to support an
inference that they are in fact acting for the corporation is
a matter to be determined by a court when the situation arises.
Much may depend upon the character of the corporation in-
volved. For example, should two .officers of an automobile
manufacturing corporation be the offenders a court might
be reluctant to treat the inference created by the presump-
tion a reasonable one. On the other hand, if two or more
members or officers of the Ku Klux Klan were the offenders
a court probably would consider the connection a reasonable
one on the ground that experience has shown the latter or-
ganization to be one which traditionally has engaged in the
type of activity prohibited by Section 2.50 However, it is the
conclusion of the author that the presumption, construed as
a prima facie presumption, should be upheld in either case,
contract; the modern concept being that all contracts are made sub-ject to the state's exercise of its police power. Cf. Home Building
and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); East New York
Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
47. Note 42, supra. In State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 79 (1897), the
court said: "A law which would in effect exclude the evidence of a
party and thereby deny him the right to be heard, would deprive
him of due process of law. A law which provides that certain
facts are conclusive proof of guilt would be unconstitutional."
48. Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1942); Western and
Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1928).
49. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1942).
50. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 75 (1929).
[Vol. 22
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since the corporation would have ample opportunity to offer
evidence in rebuttalA1
Finally, it is appropriate to inquire whether the penal
and injunctive provisions of the statute are unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment as denials of freedom of
speech and assembly52 The inclusion of Section 10, previous-
ly discussed, indicates that the legislature itself had some
doubt on this point. It was submitted at the beginning of
this paper that the inclusion of Section 10 did not foreclose
the raising of constitutional issues, and this contention is
reiterated.5
3
In Herndon v. Lowry"' the Court said: "The power of a
state to abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the ex-
ception rather than the rule and the penalizing even of utter-
ances of a defined character must find its justification in a
reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government."
In the same opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the ma-
jority, said: "The judgment of the legislature is not unfet-
tered. The limitation upon individual liberty must have ap-
propriate relation to the safety of the state."
It appears that the mere finding of, or declaration by,
the legislature that an emergency exists,55 is in itself instif-
ficient to justify the abridgement of free speech and assem-
bly.56 Therefore, one may ask .with propriety whether the
51. Cf. Mobile, J. & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
In the Indiana case of State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 79 (1897), the
court said: "If the legislature in prescribing the rules of evidence
in any class of cases leaves a party a fair opportunity to establish
his case or defense and give in evidence to the court or jury all
the facts legitimately bearing on the issues in the cause, to be con-
sidered and weighed by the tribunal trying the same, such acts
of the legislature are not unconstitutional."
not unconstitutional."
52. Note that the penal provisions are strikingly similar to the in-
validated New Jersey statute, N.J. Laws, 1935, c. 151. That act,
however, contained no provision for the issuance of injunctions.
53. There is authority for the proposition that not eveli the presump-
tion of constitutionality (note 13, supra) will be indulged in where
the statute interferes with a civil liberty as distinguished from
legislative impairment of an economic privilege. See, Schneider
v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1937); Note, 40 Col. L. Rev.
531 (1940). Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944).
54. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
55. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 56.
56. "It is . . . always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging
free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergencyjustifying it." From concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis
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"emergency" here envisaged by the Indiana legislature in
enacting the anti-hate bill was of the type which justified the
enactment of so drastic a measure. The matter would seem
to be governed by the so-called "clear and present danger"
test, the history of which is instructive as to its meaning.
Schenck v. United States,57 in which the "test" originated,
involved an indictment under the federal Espionage Act. In
the opinion in that case a full court stated the test of validity
to be as follows: "The question in every case is whether the
[prohibited] words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that [the
state] has a right to prevent."58
In 1925 in Gitlow v. New York 9 the Court was called
upon to decide whether an indictment and conviction under a
state penal statute defining "criminal anarchy" had denied
to the appellant his right of free speech under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this opinion Mr. Justice Sanford, speaking
for the majority, confirmed the conviction, saying, " . . . a
state may punish utterances endangering the foundations of
organized government and threatening its overthrow by un-
lawful means," adding that "the immediate danger is none
the less real and substantial because the effect of a given
utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. The state," contin-
ued Mr. Justice Sanford, "cannot reasonably be required to
measure the danger from every such utterance in the nice
balance of a jeweler's scale. . . . It cannot reasonably be
required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace
and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual
disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate
danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of
its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency
In a dissent Mr. Justice Holmes repeated the substance
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1926). Also note 53,
supra.
57. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
58. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, added: "It is a ques-
tion of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance
to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as
men fight, and that no court could regard them as protected by
any constitutional right." Id. p. 52.
59. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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of his opinion in the Schenck case, supra, and of his dissent
in the case of Abrams v. United States,60 saying: "Every idea
is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed
it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some
failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth."
Although the "clear and present danger test" ennunciat-
ed in the Sehenek case was not expressly repudiated in the
Gitlow case, the Court thought that the test was not to be
applied "where the legislative body itself has previously de-
termined the danger of substantive evil. arising from utter-
ances of a specified character." In the opinion in Herndon
v. Lowry, supra, the Court returned to the standard of the
Schenck case. In the Herndon case a majority held that it
was insufficient to sustain a conviction under a Georgia stat-
ute, punishing the offenses of insurrection and inciting to
insurrection, that the accused intended that an insurrection
"should happen at any time within which he might reasonably
expect his influence to continue to be directly operative in
causing such action by those whom he sought to induce.",',
It should be noted that in each of the above cases the
statute in question sought to prevent combinations and utter-
ances which threatened or were thought to threaten the se-
curity of organized government itself. The Indiana statute
is not so restricted in its purposes, making the malicious do-
ing of the acts prohibited by Section 2 (B) unlawful when-
ever they cause, tend, or threaten to cause "riot, disorder, in-
terference with traffic upon the streets or public highways,
destruction of property, breach of peace, violence, or denial
of civil or constitutional rights." Nowhere is it contended
that these consequences go so far as to threaten immediately
the security of organized government; nor is such a threat
made a condition precedent to the illegality of the acts.
In striking down the New Jersey statute, previously re-
ferred to,62 the New Jersey court apparently applied the above
strict "clear and present danger" test. Shortly following the
decision in that case it was suggested in a note published in
the Columbia Law Review 63 that the New Jersey court had
60. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
61. The appellant was a paid organizer for the Communist Party in
the South.
62. Note 2, Supra.
63. 42 Col. L. Rev. 857 (1942).
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erred in its holding. It was noted that the "clear and present
danger" test seemingly has been "broadened to justify re-
strictions upon expression which threatens to bring about
'destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of
privacy, or breach of peace."' Dissenting opinions in three
cases-all holding unconstitutional restrictions upon freedom
of expression-were cited.6 4 Also cited were Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,5 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies, Ine.,60 and Carpenters and Joiners Union v.
Ritter's Cafe.67
It is often repeated that, quite apart from utterances
threatening the security of organized government, "the right
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all cir-
cumstances." Better stated perhaps, society has an interest
in protecting against actual injuries, and when words have
the effect of inflicting a "present injury" or "render highly
probable an immediate breach of the peace," the words may
be treated as 'acts' and dealt with accordingly.68 Thus cer-
tain picketing has been enjoined, not as speech, but as a type
of conduct which is not protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6 9 The Court in the Chaplinsky case held that it was
proper to punish for a breach of the peace for calling an of-
ficer a "damned racketeer" and a "damned fascist." The
Court thought that these were "fighting words"-not merely
a communication of ideas.70 It was held in Cantwell v. Con-
neetiout,71 however, that the playing of a phonograph record
containing an attack upon a religious organization of which
some of the listeners were members did not justify a convic-
tion for 'breach of the peace. This was 'speech' within the
64. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connec-
ticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88(1940).
65. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
66. 312 U.S. 237 (1941).
67. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
68. Chafee, "Free Speech in the United States" (1940), pp. 149 et seq.
69. Gregory, "Labor and the Law" (1946) pp. 334-377, discussing the
Ritter and Meadowmoor cases.
70. In the more recent case of Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158(1944), it was held that a law prohibiting child labor may be
enforced against one who allows a child under his care to sell
religious literature on the streets. This result was reached by
labeling the child's activity as 'labor' rather than an exercise of
religious liberty.
71. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding
the fact that the contents of the record provoked the indigna-
tion of listeners and stimulated in them a desire to strike the
operator of the phonograph. The Court said: "Although the
contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we
think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to de-
fine and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and
present danger to a substantial interest of the state, the pe-
titioner's communication raised no such clear and present men-
ace to public peace and order as to render him liable to con-
viction of the common law offense in question." (Italics add-
ed.) Whether the Indiana statute is "narrowly drawn to
define and punish specific conduct" is the pertinent question.
In this connection it should be noted that the Indiana
legislature did not attempt to determine in advance the type
of conduct which shall be held to result in the consequences
enumerated, but left it to the courts to make this determina-
tion as the particular situations arise.7 2 This feature of the
Indiana act would seem to exclude it from the rule of the
Gitlow case supra, "'where the legislative body itself [had]
previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising
from utterances of a special character," and at the same time
may render the statute void for an indefiniteness similar to
that discussed in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.73 In
that case the Court said: "Obsedrve that the section forbids
no specific or definite act . . . [To] attempt to enforce the
section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to carry
out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and
unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury."7' (Ital-
ics added.) Similarly, the Indiana statute would seem to
license the court "to create its own standard [of guilt] in
each case."' 5
Under the injunctive p&rovisions of Section 4 the judge
alone would be able to create and enforce the standard of guilt,
since there is no right to trial by jury in equity proceedings.
72. Compare State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 402, 22 A. (2d) 877,
881 (1941).
73. 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921). See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373(1913); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
74. Quoted in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937).
75. Cf. Herndon v. Lowry, supra, at 263.
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The opportunity for abuses inherent in this feature of the
statute is obvious, and much popular criticism has resulted
when courts have exercised their equity powers in the preven-
tion of crime. The reasons for such criticism are multiplied
when the crime to be enjoined is in the nature of defamation6
or otherwise consists of communication of ideas. Under the
Blackstonian interpretation of free speech, only 'previous
restraint' was prohibited, there being no "freedom from cen-
sure for criminal matter when published. '17 Though this
interpretation is no longer recognized as adequate,78 previous
restraint remains the most obvious threat to freedom of
speech 79 and should be resorted to, if at all, only in extreme
situations, that is, situations in which thdre is a "clear and
present danger" that the threatened communication will
bring about "a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent."
It is submitted, therefore, that the validity of an in-
junction drawn in the language of Section 2 (B) and the
validity of the criminal provisions, previously discussed,
should be determined by the same test. If the danger is so
clear, so imminent and so serious as to warrant application
of the statute's criminal provisions, it seems that the public
interest in preventing the evil would more than outweigh the
interest in avoiding, in the particular case, the possible abuses
attendant upon the issuance of injunctions against crimes.
Otherwise, it is submitted, the "clear and present danger"
test means little, if anything. Both Section 4 and Section 3,
which provides for penalties, have as their purpose the pre-
vention of the type of activity prohibited by Section 2. When
the legislature seeks to accomplish an objective in one case
by threat of punishment and in the other by previous re-
straint, the distinction to' be drawn seems tenuous if the valid-
ity of either means depends upon an application of the "clear
and present danger" test.-"
76. Gee v. Pritchard, .2 Swanst. 402 (1818); Brandreth v. Lance, 8
Paige 24 (1839).
77. Blackstone, Commentaries, IV, 151; Chafee, Free Speech in the
United States (1940), p. 9.
78. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931).
79. State v. Klapprott, 127 N.J.L. 395, 22 A. (2d) 877 (1941).
80. In People v. American Socialist Society, 202 App. Div. 640, 195
N.Y.S. 801 (1st Dept., 1922), the court said: "A state has as much
right to guard against the commission of an offense against its
laws as to inflict punishment upon the offender after it shall have
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Although in Near v. Minnesota8 the Court, by way of
dictum, applies a more rigid test to statutes involving pre-
vious restraint than to those involving criminal sanction
only,8 2 it may be significant that some of the recent cases
which are said to have relaxed the "clear and present dan-
ger" standard have been cases involving injunctions. 3
Another aspect of the Indiana statute worth noting is
that the act does not limit the penal sanctions to those in-
stances where the actor intends one or more of the enumerated
results."' Finally it should be observed that subsection (A)
of Section 2 fails even to specify the consequences which are
made a condition precedent to the operation of subsection (B).
It is suggested, however, that a court might well read these
two subsections together.
been committed." Cf. Danskln v. San Diego Unified School Dis-
trict, 171 P. (2d) 885, 899 (1946) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97 (1940).
81. 283 U.S. 697, (1931).
82. The Court had reference to criminal libel, and said, at page 715:
" . . .it is recognized that punishment for the abuse of the liberty
accorded to the press is essential to the protection of the public,
and that the common law rules that subject the libeler to respon-
sibility for the public offense, as well as for the private injury,
are not abolished by the protection extended in our constitutions
[but] in the present case we have no occasion to inquire as
to the permissible scope of subsequent punishment. For whatever
wrong the appellant has committed or may commit, by his pub-
lications, the state appropriately affords both public and private
redress by its libel laws . . . The statute in question does not
deal with punishments; it provides for no punishment, except in
case of contempt for violation of the court's order, but for sup-
pression and injunction, that is, for restraint upon publication."
The Court declared this type of statute unconstitutional.
83. E.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U.S. 237 (1941); Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe,
315 U.S. 722 (1942).
84. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 351 (1926), which involved
an application of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. This
Act defined "criminal syndicalism" as "any doctrine or precept
advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of
crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful
and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property),
or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of. accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or affecting any political change." The
Act declared guilty of a felony "any person who organizes or as-
sists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of, any
organization, society, group or assemblage or persons organized
or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndic-
alism." The decision of the state court upholding the statute was
affirmed on procedural grounds. Mr. Justice Brandeis, however,
wrote a brilliant and inspiring concurring opinion in which Mr.
Justice Holmes joined. In this opinion it was said that " .
where a statute is valid only in case certain conditions exist, the en-
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Conclusion
Whatever may be the constitutional fate of Indiana's
anti-hate act, it is difficult to refute the merit or deny the
applicability of these words of the late Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"Those who won our independence believed that .
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate pro-
tection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be
a fundamental principle of the American Government ...
"No danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for
full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence.'85
And ponder the words of Chafee:
"The danger is not in the suppression of any particular
doctrine or group, but in the very existence of suppression
. . . The suppression of opponents has the same delightful
fascination in our day that cutting off head had in the French
Revolution. But the moderate republicans who first rejoiced
in that method soon found it employed by their opponents,
and the control of the guillotine shifted from group to group,
of increasingly extreme views, until finally the conservatives
seized it and beheaded Robespierre."6
THE ANTI-STRIKE ACT
Chapter 341 is designed to prevent disruption of public
utility services resulting from strikes, slowdowns, lockouts
or similar work stoppages in the electric, gas, water, tele-
phone or transportation industries.' Strikes are prohibited
actment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which
are essential to its validity." For complete concurring opinion
see pp. 372-380 of the report.
85. Concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 351, 375,
377 (1926).
86. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (1940), p. 527. Cf.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
1. The act has been informally interpreted as not being applicable
to municipally owned utilities in view of the construction that a
statute must be in terms applicable to the sovereign or its po-
[Vol. 22
